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ABSTRACT
The aggregate (or pooled) labor skill differential in the manufacturing
sector remains relatively stable over the twenty-two year period 1952-73, in
spite of swings in the business cycle over this time plus sharply increasing
rates of inflation the past decade.
Within this overall picture, one discerns interesting secular trends
among individual cities (metropolitan labor markets) when the manufacturing
sector is disaggregated. The twenty- two year movements in the manufacturing
skill differentials for 10 of 16 U.S. cities is toward convergence at one of
two central- tendency values. A comparison of degrees of unionization of all
16 cities with respective secular skill differential estimates in 1973 supports
the proposition that within the manufacturing sector the secular reduction in
variance among cities is accompanied by a reallignment into "unionized city"
and "less-unionized city" elements. The manufacturing skill differential
central-tendency value for less-unionized cities is about 15 percent greater
than that for the unionized cities.
In the non-manufacturing sector during 1965-73, the labor skill
differentials widened dramatically in 12 of 14 cities with adequate data. This
coincides with the change in economic conditions about 1965, as nationwide
the civilian labor force approached full employment and annual inflation
rates began an upward climb. Skill differentials in the non-manufacturing
sector generally are more responsive to changing market conditions than in
the manufacturing sector, so further tests provide estimates of the "pure
inflation" effects on the non-manufacturing skill differentials of the
respective cities.
I set out a group of interrelated propositions regarding various
wage relationships in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. These
propositions are examined to provide some light on the decidedly different
behavior of labor skill differentials in the two sectors during 1965-73.
Industrywide collective bargaining, consolidated bargaining, and
coercive comparisons within the more-unionized manufacturing sector have
resulted in negotiated wage-scale rigidities that would seem impervious to
business cycle or inflation shocks. The level of the overall x^age scale in
this administered manufacturing sector is generally higher than in the more
competitive non-manufacturing sector, providing employers in manufacturing
with a wage premium with which to maintain labor queues over the course of
normal business fluctuations.
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Employers in the non-manufacturing sector bid to attract skilled
workers from manufacturing as demand increases and labor markets tighten. As
the economy experiences the Phillips Curve squeeze, non-manufacturing employers
increase their wage-offers for skilled workers at rates-of-change that exceed
the inflation-induced increases in the manufacturing sector.
This horizontal wage-link for skilled workers between the two sectors
during the phenomena of tight labor markets-plus-inflation is absent in markets
for unskilled workers. The impact on relative wage changes from the entrance
of significant numbers of labor reserve individuals into the ranks of unskilled
workers during tight labor markets is concentrated in non-manufacturing un-
skilled laborers. This outward shift of the labor supply curve in the more
competitive non-manufacturing unskilled labor markets results in a depressing
force on relative wage changes for this element of the labor force.
The economic conditions affecting the rate of wage increases for
skilled workers in non-manufacturing when combined with the other diverse
forces depressing wage increases for non-manufacturing unskilled workers are
mutually reinforcing in inducing a sharp widening of the non-manufacturing
skill differential during inflation.

IMPACT OF THE RECENT INFLATION
ON LABOR SKILL DIFFERENTIALS
Robert N. Schoeplein
The skill differential (also termed the occupational differential
or skill margin) is a measure of the percentage difference between the hourly
earnings of workers designated as skilled and those designated as unskilled.
This concept is used as one indicator of the relative economic well-being of
two major groups of earners. A period of sharp inflation such as that exper-
ienced in the United States since 1965 may be a pervasive force distorting
relative earnings patterns throughout the economy. Government anti-infla-
tionary wage policy - such as the wage-price freeze in August, 1971 - in turn
may not be neutral with regard to relative earnings patterns. If relative wages
indeed are distorted during inflation, government intervention could further
distort the changed relative economic well-being among workers or, alternat"
tively, could mitigate the exceptional situation.
This paper analyzes labor skill differentials in the United States
during the twenty-two year period 1952-73. Both the manufacturing and the
non-manufacturing sectors are studied, because the respective skill differ-
entials in the two sectors had decidedly different patterns during the 1965-
73 inflation, The skill differentials in the manufacturing sector have re-
Any comments or suggestions for further refinement of this working
paper will be appreciated. I am pleased to acknowledge the following
assistance in preparation of this paper: Carol King, for data gathering in
the earlier stages; Dale Parr, for data collection, programming, and excel-
lent general assistance; Helen Lowry, for programming and statistical
assistance; and the librarians at the Institute of Labor and Industrial Re-
lations, University of Illinois-Urbana. Primary elements of this study are
sponsored by a U. S. Department of Labor research contract.
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mained relatively stable throughout the two decades, though one discerns
interesting secular trends among individual cities when the sector is dis-
aggregated. Skill differentials in the non-manufacturing sector (specified
here as excluding government services, the construction, extractive, and
agriculture industries) are generally more volatile during the "normal"
economic fluctuations prior to 1965, and then rose sharply as the economy
experienced relative full-employment plus sharp increases in price indices.
The non-manufacturing skill differentials in the bulk of sampled U.S. cities
indeed rose well above secular averages during the first nine years of this
present inflation, meaning that the relative economic well-being was sharply
distorted in the favor of skilled workers.
The labor skill differential of course is an incomplete measure of
relative economic welfare. This indicator only purports the relationship
of straight-time hourly earnings of skilled and unskilled workers. The total
hours worked and consequent weekly or monthly earnings are not measured.
Nor are premium pay for overtime, late shifts or weekends included. The
focal point moreover is on the hourly earnings of the individual worker;
the welfare implications of changing real incomes when a second family
member secures employment during tight labor markets are not considered.
But to the extent that labor skill differentials in one major sector jump
sharply upward during tight employment-and-inflation, the realtive welfare
of the composite family unit may be affected.
Nonproduction bonuses are excluded, but cost of living allow-
ances and incentive earnings are included.

3.
PRELUDE
Our concentration is on the impact of the recent inflation on
skill differentials. The forces exerting on wage changes are complex, and
to appreciate inflation effects we must attempt to abstract from other
secular and cyclical considerations. The overall abstract framework for
the study of skill differentials is dominated by two perspectives of the
labor market; the first is the basic premise of reasonably-competitive
markets, and the second stresses strategies and conditions under institu-
tional settings of collective bargaining and bi-lateral concentrated
economic power. Economists have tended to stress the familiar competitive
economic model in seeking a theoretical foundation for changes in the labor
skill differential over time, though in reality the forces exerted thorough
collective bargaining—only secondarily reflecting existing or anticipated
market conditions—may profoundly affect the skill differentials in specific
labor markets.
According to the competitive model, skilled jobs should pay more
than unskilled jobs by an amount necessary to cover the costs involved in
acquiring skill—namely, training costs and income foregone
—
plus a surplus
allowing for a return on investments in skills equal to the return attain-
able on alternative investments. The skill differential is affected in
the long run by changes in labor supply, or changes in adjustment of supply
to changing labor market demand conditions. Historically the skill dif-
ferential has been affected by immigration and by migration from agriculture
to industry. The skill differential in manufacturing secularly narrowed
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2/throughout the first half of this century. This secular decline has
been attributed to the decline in immigration over the fifty-year period
3/
and changes in the cost and time of education.
Economists have identified a stabilization in the manufacturing
4/
skill differential between the early-fifties. and the mid-sixties. The
various authors generally have compared index-values or individual-city
values of the manufacturing skill differential in the first year of the
study with comparable values in the last year, rather than analyze year-
by-year variations in the skill differential throughout the period. The
different methods of measurement have resulted in conflicting claims of a
modest narrowing or an overall modest widening of this skill differential
during the approximate fifteen-year period, but aggregate national manu-
facturing wage indexes or other measures of median skill differential values
among several cities would substantiate the general argument that the skill
differential in manufacturing stabilized between 1952 and 1964.
2
Paul G. Keat, "Long-Run Changes in Occupational Wage Structure,
1900-1956," Journal of Political Economy, 68 (December 1960), pp. 584-600;
Harry Ober, "Occupational Wage Differentials, 1907-1947," Monthly Labor
Review , 71 (August 1948), pp. 127-134.
3
Keat, op.cit. 594-599.
4
Martin Segal, "Occupational Wage Differentials in Major Cities During
the 1950 's" Mark Perlman, ed. Human Resources in the Urban Economy ,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. pp. 195-207. Also George H.
Hildebrand and George E. Delehanty. "Wage Levels and Differentials," in
Robert A. Gordon and Margaret S. Gordon, Ed. Prosperity and Unemployment ,
New York: Wiley, 1966. pp. 265-301
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The competitive labor market framework also has been a basis for
theoretical postulates on cyclical movements in the skill differential.
Melvin Reder and Walter Oi agree that the skill differential in a quasi-
competitive setting ought to widen during a recession and narrow as the
economy approaches full employment, though each offers an alternative
theory in explanation. Reder stresses relative elasticities of supply
in both skilled and unskilled workers during recessions and expansions.
Labor is more mobile in the downward directions because of the costs and time
in acquiring new skills. Unemployed skilled workers during a recession
sharply expand the stock of available unskilled in competing for employ-
ment, according to Reder. The clearing wage in the competitive market for
unskills consequently suffers relative to the (recession) wages of skilled
workers. The labor mobility is in the opposite direction as the economy
expands and labor markets tighten. Employers turn to on-the-job training
and other upgrading of unskilled workers in their efforts to fill skilled
positions. The remaining stock of unskilled workers therefore shrinks,
vis-a-vis the skilled market, and the skill differential correspondingly
narrows during this expansionary period.
Oi alternatively stresses the investment-in-skill-acquisition
approach to variations in the skill differential over the business cycle,
Melvin Reder, "The Theory of Occupational Wage Differentials,"
American Economic Review , 45 (December 1955), pp. 833-852. Also Reder,
"Wage Structure Theory and Measurement," in National Bureau of Economic
Research, Aspects of Labor Economics , Princeton, 1962, pp. 257-311. Walter
Oi, "Labor as a Quasi-fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy , 70
(December 1962), pp. 538-555.
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still within the general framework of competitive labor markets. Oi argues
that skilled workers have a greater "degree of fixity", which relates hiring
6/
and training expenses over the employment period to total employment costs.
Employers who profit-maximize presumably will prefer to retain workers with
"high fixity" (i.e. skilled workers) during economic downturns, rather than
turn them loose. Oi notes that even the intermediate course of laying off
workers, rather than dismissing them, is expensive in subsequent hiring and
training expenses as only 39 percent of total workers laid off during 1953-
58 were recalled by their respective firms. This employer-hoarding therefore
results in a relatively more moderate decline in the danand for skilled
workers than the unskilled during a recession and a consequent widening in
the skill differential.
Oi's competitive-market theory regarding a widening of the skill
differential during recessions has been further refined by Reder and by S. C.
Salop. Reder observed that "grades" exist within most skilled occupations
that reflect experience in addition to basic skills. Employers tend to try
and retain the experienced workers in each skill occupation during a recession,
and hence there is a bias for average effective wages among employed skilled
workers during a recession to remain higher than the case of a single-grade,
one-wage occupation. Salop modifies Oi's argument to consider situations
8/
where the firm has some control to affect its wage-rates Salop provides a
Oi. op. cit. p. 541.
Reder. "Wage Structure Theory and Measurement" op. cit. p. 271.
o
S. C. Salop, "Wage Differentials in a Dynamic Theory of the Firm,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 6 (August 1973), pp. 321-344.
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theoretical basis to demonstrate that an optimizing firm never discharges
labor in a recession where training and turnover costs are minimal-as with
unskilled workers. Rather, the firm follows the alternative strategy of
lowering the wage rate and thereby inducing excess labor to quit while saving
9/
some wage costs on remaining employees. The training and turnover costs for
skilled workers, however, may be sufficiently high that the alternative
employer-hoarding strategy discussed by Oi or temporary layoffs may be pre-
ferable to reductions in the skilled wage rates.
In any event 5 neither Reder nor Oi place much stress on the respon-
siveness of the labor skill differential to short-term changes in overall
employment levels. Reder compared wage indices for the manufacturing sector
skill differential during the peak-and-trough years of 1918-19, 1931-32,
1937-40, and 1945-47 to discern that the skill differential was narrower during
low-employment periods and wider during the depression. Reder further commented,
"But our hypothesis does not imply that it (the skill differential) should
vary with small changes in business conditions; the ordinary period of pros-
perity does not usually absorb a large enough fraction of the labor reserve to
induce a sharp rise in unskilled rates." Oi also focused on the early
Depression years and 1951-58. Oi tested a variant of skill differentials;
9
Ibid. p. 327.
Reder. "The Theory of Occupational Wage Differentials," op. cit.
p. 842.
U
0i Op. Cit. 547-553.
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he postulated that high-wage occupations would experience smaller rates of
change in employment than the low-wage counterparts during the Depression
years 1928-30. Oi's analysis of high-wage and low-wage workers in four
selected industries tended to support his hypothesis and its converse that
"low-wage occupations, corresponding to low-degrees of fixity, do experience
12/
relatively greater changes in employment."
In addition to the possible effect of significant changes in
labor demand or labor supply on the skill differential, arguments have been
advanced that inflation accompanying prosperity would act as an independent
force to further narrow the skill differential. J. R. Hicks is frequently
cited for his remarks in 1955 that during severe inflation employers and
13/
employees alike acknowledge the purchasing power plight of low-wage workers.
A reinforcing assumption is that low-wage workers will fight harder to
protect their real incomes. from the damaging effects of price increases on
, . 14/
real income.
Actual tests of the independent impact of inflation and the labor
skill differential to date "have been sparse and inconclusive." Much
of the discussion centers on Robert Evan's 1963 study of changes in skill
differentials during the Civil War, World War I, and World War II.
12
Ibid. p. 549.
13
J. R. Hicks, "Economic Foundations of Wage Policy, "Economic
Journal
,
65 (September 1955), pp. 389-404.
14
Richard Perlman. Labor Theory. New York, Wiley, 1959, p. 100.
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Evans used a historical index of wages of skilled handicraftsmen and
unskilled laborers for the Civil War period and ratios of union wage scales
in the building trades for the latter two wartime periods. No data are
presented on unemployment during the Civil War years, so an observation
that the constructed skill differential declined each year from 1861 to
1865 and rose in 1866 cannot be tested to distinguish between a) the effects
of shifts in labor excess demand or excess supply, or b) an independent in-
flationary effect. Likewise, Evan's observations on the narrowing skill
differential in the building trades during both world wars are inconclusive.
Using Evan's data, the respective labor markets were "tight" (as distinguished
from "tightening) in only one year during the four-year World War I period.
Correspondingly, only two years during the Second World War lend themselves
to a possible "test" of the skill differential-inflation hypothesis. Indeed,
a period of tight labor markets ("full employment") as short as one or two
years may be inadequate to test a pure inflation effect because of the
possibility of lags in adjustment of supply in both markets for skilled and
unskilled workers that could be too sensitive to discern in so short an
observation period.
A recent article by Gustman and Segal provides another insight
on the changes in skill differentials during an inflationary period, though
18/
the authors concentrate on secular trends and unemployment effects.
The authors stress that the skill differential in the building construction
Perlman, op. cit. p. 102.
18
Alan L. Gustman and Martin Segal, "The Skilled-Unskilled Wage
Differential in Construction," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27
(January 1974) pp. 261-75.
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industry declines secularly during the period 1953-70. The authors further
conjecture that the differential would narrow still more if overall unem-
ployment were to fall below 3.5 percent. Yet the skill differential for
this industry as calculated by Gustman and Segal actually widened consistently
19/
each year over the five-year period 1965-69.
Gustman and Segal put forth a unique labor-market cycles hypothesis
that is relevant for our later analysis of the non-manufacturing sector.
The authors argue that labor markets in the building construction sector are
not competitive or quasi-competitive and therefore do not fit the Reder or
Oi framework for relative wage movements over the business cycle. The authors
suggest that the sharp divisions along craft and union lines in construction
inhibit the kind of upgrading that Reder noted as an important supplement to
the supply of skilled workers during economic expansion. Any interdependence
that may exist between union policies for skilled craftsmen and unions
representing the unskilled may weaken during a prolonged upswing. Any excess
supply of skilled craftsmen may decrease more rapidly than any excess of the
unskilled, because of compartmentalization of occupations reinforcing the
relatively inelastic supply of the skilled. The relative bargaining position
of the skilled craftsmen therefore is strengthened. Since there is less
concern about nonunion competition during an upswing, there is less incentive
for the various craft and trade unions to coordinate wage and strike policies
20/
even when operating under joint demand.
19
Ibid. p. 262
20
Ibid. pp. 269-70.
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The basic model of Gustman and Segal concentrates on changes in
unemployment rates and time trend variables; discussion of a pure inflation
effect is not included.
The building construction industry is unique among the sectors
because of its structure and economic volatility; for these reasons I have
excluded this industry from the detailed analysis of either the manufacturing
or the non-manufacturing sectors. Nonetheless both the contributions and
the omission in the Gustman and Segal work are provocative. Perhaps relative
wages between skilled and unskilled workers actually run contrary to script
during periods of tight labor markets and rapidly accelerating inflation.
The volatility of relative wages, employment, and prices since 1965 affords
a unique opportunity to examine determinants of change in the labor skill
differential.
THE BASIC MODEL, AND DATA SOURCES
The attention in this study is focused on changes in the labor skill
differential during the twenty-two year period 1952-73, with specific emphasis
on the inflationary period 1965-73. The abstract economic model in functional
form is D = D (U, P) ; where D is the labor skill differential, U is unemploy-
ment, and P is the consumer price index. This is a common variant of the
microtheory competitive market for labor services, wherein labor utilization
is a function of the real wage and labor supply.
The skill differential is specified as the ratio of weighed wages
of skilled workers to the weighed wages of unskilled workers for a given period
of time, or W / W . These are specific average hourly effective wages and
not either contractual wage rates nor a measure of total weekly compensation.
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The skill differentials are expressed on a percentage basis, rather than on
absolute differences. The percentage basis more accurately portrays changes
in relative welfare positions among different classes of workers, which is my
21/
ODjective.
Since the labor skill differential is a composite of different
occupation wages, the three critical dynamic variables are changing wages,
prices^ and unemployment. This work therefore bears a resemblance to the
many recent wage determination studies using these same variables and con-
sequently shares inherent methodological and statistical problems.
Unemployment rates have been used by economists both in relative
and absolute wage determination studies as a proxy for the excess supply
conditions in the labor market. As such, this variable has come under crit-
icism for reasons of market structure or because of measurement considerations
The first argument notes that when labor markets are not competitive, the
tradeoff between wages and unemployment is not direct but rather works
22/indirectly through product demand and bargaining power.
21
For a more detailed discussion of the relative merits of the
alternative specifications of the skill differential, see Perlman, Labor
Theory
,
op. cit. pp. 85-92.
22
Daniel S. Hamermesh, "Wage Bargains, Threshold Effects, and the
Phillips Curve," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (August 1970) pp. 501-517
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The second concern over using unemployment rates as a proxy
for the excess supply of labor is that the unemployment rate alone cannot
23/
adequately represent labor market conditions. Wachter points out that
during the 1966-69 period the unemployment rate was nearly constant at a
rate below 4.0 percent "full employment", but vacancies increased. Thus
on the labor demand side a true labor market variable should have signaled
24/increasing tightness over the period, instead of a "tight" condition.
On the supply side the official specification of what individuals
constitute the civilian labor force excludes consideration of the labor
reserve. This labor reserve is an estimate of the deviation of the actual
labor force from the labor force that would be observed if the economy were
continuously at "true" full employment. The labor reserve includes dis-
courged workers and secondary workers (principally women and youth). This is
a valid concern, as studies have indicated that during periods of less than
full employment the level of reported unemployment understates the magnitude
of available labor reserves, and that the reported unemployment rate overstates
25/
the amount of excess demand in the labor market. One frustration with
consideration of the labor reserve force is that estimates of this economic
variable also present controversial measurement problems.
23
Michael L. Wachter, "A Labor Supply Model for Secondary Workers,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (May 1972), pp. 141-151.
24
Ibid. p. 145.
25
N. J. Simler and Alfred Telia, "Labor Reserves and the Phillips
Curve," The Review of Economics and Statistics 50 (February 1968) pp. 32-49.
9 ft
C. F. Wayne Vroman, "The Labor Force Reserve: A Re-Estimate,"
Industrial Relations, 9 (1969-70), pp. 374-393.
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Moreover, the available estimates for the labor force reserve are at the national
level, and this study concentrates on individual urban labor markets. I shall
not dismiss consideration of the labor market reserve completely, however;
secondary worker movements into the labor force may be an important element in
understanding movements in the skill differential during 1965-69—specifically
in the non-manufacturing sector.
Nonetheless I shall use unemployment rates as an acceptable proxy for excess
labor supply. This is a reasonable measure, and even critics have ended up
27/incorporating it into their estimation models. My statistical models will
actually use the reciprocals of unemployment rates. The improved fits obtained
confirm the arguments of others that the rationale for the transformation: that
at some high level of unemployment, wage dispersion becomes relatively insen-
28/
sitive to further increases in unemployment.
The worker-employer hiring transaction turns on the level of real wages
in the competitive theory of labor markets. Whether in this theoretical
context or in studies of money wage determination, changes in the consumer price
could largely be ignored if one assumed that workers and employers alike had
27
Hamermesh, op. cit., p. 509; William A. Howard and N. Arnold Tolles,
"Wage Determination in Key Manufacturing Industries, 1950-70," Industrial and
Labor RElations Review 2 7 ( July, 1974) pp. 553-556
28
Michael L. Wachter, "Cyclical Variation in the Interindustry Wage
Structure," American Economic Review 60 (March 1970) pp. 75-84. See also
Hamermesh, op. cit; p. 509; and Arnold H. Packer and Seong H. Park, "Distortions
in Relative Wages and Shifts in the Phillips Curve." The Review of Economics
and Statistics 55 ( February 1973), pp. 16-22; and Gustman and Segal, op. cit.
pp. 261-275.

15.
correct expectations that the modest rate of change in the consumer price
29/index would remain constant.
It is only when changes in the price index take sharp, unexpected upward
or downward jumps that the wage determination process might be affected.
Hamermesh has commented, "It may be that there Is some threshold rate of
inflation that awakens workers to the erosion in their living standards. This
feeling may in turn be reflected in the settlements reached by the negoti-
ators representing these workers. To the extent that such feelings exist,
30/they should be incorporated in equations explaining wage changes." I
therefore shall use annual rates change in the consumer price indexes rather
than the absolute levels of these indexes, as a concentration on changes in
the rate of change in a price index will minimize the bias of long-run
creeping inflation.
My basic model to ascertain "pure inflation" effects on labor skill
-1 °
differentials, then, is D = D(u
, p ) where D is the annual skill differ-
ential in either the manufacturing or the non-manufacturing sectors of
selected U. S. urban areas. The reciprocal of unemployment and the percen-
tage change in the consumer price index from the preceding year are the
local values of these variables for each respective urban area. This spec-
ification is but one step removed from the popular wage determination models
29
For a comprehensive theoretical analysis of wage change theory with
anticipated inflation see Jim Taylor, Unemployment and Wage Inflation . Burnt
Meadow, U.K.; Longman, 1974, esp. pp. 49-56.
30
Hamermesh, op. cit. p. 504
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31/
recently criticized by Cargill and Meyer, and Rowley and Wilton. Cargill
and Meyer offer the following as a "representative" distributed lag wage
determination model:
W (t) = I
33
" B. (t) p (t-x)
T—O 1
+ if B, ( T ) U"1 (t-x) + e (t)t=o I n
W (t) : percentage change in the money wage rate
P (t) : percentage change in the price level
U (t) : reciprocal of the unemployment ratio
e (t) : residual term.
Cargill and Meyer then note that the variables entering the wage equation
must be regarded as coming from a larger structural system of equations. It is
unrealistic to assume the absence of feedback between wages and prices
(and—in a longer time horizon—between wages and employment) . Cargill and
Meyer continue, "Most studies simply avoid the issue by adopting a single-
32/
equation approach with the least squares (OLS)."
There is no simple solution to alleviate this serial correla-
tion dilemma. The presence of serial correlation is acknowledge in some
of the subsequent excercises in this paper, and I shall discuss the
probable impact on coefficient estimation. Minimal use of lengthy
31
Thomas F. Cargill and Robert A. Meyer, "Wages, Prices »J
Unemployment
Distributed Lag Estimates," Journal of the ^^-^^^^^^^
69 (March 1974), pp. 98-107. J.C.R. Rowley and D.A. Welton,
Quarterly Model,
of Wage Determine? ion: Some New Efficient Estimates,"
Americ^n^conomic
Review, 63( June 1973) pp. 380-389
32Cargill and Meyer, op. cit. p. 99.
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distributed lag functions may tend to reduce, though not eliminate this
problem.
It is reasonable to assume that money wages alone may respond with
distinct lags to either changing labor market conditions or to rising
inflation. Wachter has commented, "One would expect the lags to be quite
long. First, to the extent that wage contracts in the unionized sector are
as long at three years, the adjustment lag of noncompetitive firms can be
expected to be at least three years. Second, in general, the longer the time
horizon of the forecast (made necessary by the fixed wage contract), the
33/longer the expectational lag." Wachter' s dependent variable in this cited
study is the coefficient of variation in overall average inter-industry wages.
His lag weights indicate that the lag-in-response is 50 percent complete
in the year t+3 for changes in the rate of change in prices, and in the year
t+1 for changes in the reciprocal of unemployment. In Wachter 1 s 19 70 paper
on the same subject, the bulk of response in interindustry wage variations
34/
to changing unemployment occur immediately or with a one-year lag.
Though there is some evidence to support the proposition changes in
unemployment or inflation will affect the level of money wages with a lag
or lag-series, there is no obvious a priori reason why the labor skill dif-
ferential ought to be likewise affected through a complex lag-structure
33
Michael L. Wachter, "Phase II, Cost-Push Inflation, and Relative Wages."
American Economic Review (64 ( June 19 74), p. 485
Wachter, American Economic Review s 60 (March 1970) op. cit, p. 80.
On the issue of the impact of 2 or 3-year labor contracts on "wage round"
theory, see Hemermesh, op. cit; p. 502.
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relationship. Nonetheless, some sample experiments were performed on the data
using a series of straightforward annual lags and distributed lags. As the
analyses will indicate, more sophisticated polynomial distributed lags and
other distributed lag functions are not relevant to the data at hand. The
labor skill differential in the manufacturing sector is remarkably stable
throughout the twenty-two year period, in spite of significant and abrupt
shifts in important economic parameters. In the non-manufacturing sector during
1952-64, the labor skill differential in many sample-cities responds to
shifts in unemployment during the year in question or with a one-year lag.
At the outset of the present sharp inflation in 1965, the labor skill dif-
ferential in the vast majority of the sample-cities jumps sharply upward
immediately or with a one-year lag. Further lag analysis therefore is not
critical.
At the outset I had to make a decision between studying labor skill
differentials in an indu try context (such as "Furniture;" "foundries") or
in a geographic labor market area. I chose the latter route, largely on the
premise that relative welfare is the relation of a worker to his peers and
others within the context of his surroundings. Each approach has merit to
its own subset of issues.
The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes annual Area Wage Surveys
35/for Major Standard Metropolitan Statistical area's in the U. S. The six-
teen metropolitan areas in this study were selected so that two or more cities
35
U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Area Wage
Survey . Washington, D. C. Annual, by metropolitan area. Bulletin numbers
vary annually and are listed for all areas on the inside back cover of each
issue.
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were located in the four U. S. Census regions: northeast, north central, south
and west. Additional cities were added from the"north central" region (e.g.
Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, etc.) to facilitate an anticipated in-depth
regional analysis. While no conscious effort was made to design this study
to complement any specific prior work, twelve cities herein correspond with
twelve of the sixteen cities in the separate studies by Segal and by Hilde-
brand and Delehanty. The sixteen metropolitan areas in this project are:
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnatti, Cleveland, Dallas, Davenport-Moline
(Quad Cities i Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St . Paul,
New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco-Oakland (identified as
"San Francisco")
.
The manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors were selected for
analysis. The manufacturing sector is familiar; the non-manufacturing sector
as specified throughout this study is comprised of transportation; commu-
nication, and other public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance;
insurance; real estate; and services. Major industry groups specifically
excluded from non-manufacturing as specified are government operations,
construction, and the extractive industries. The non-manufacturing sector
therefore covers a large segment of the U. S. economy with significant num-
bers of skilled workers, while at the same time excludes the volatile con-
struction industry.
Four skilled occupations were chosen as representative of the 13 skilled
occupations (or journeymen) commonly reported in the area wage surveys over
the twenty-two year period: maintenance electricians, stationary engineers,
machinists, and machine-tool operators. Two standard unskilled occupations
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are used: janitors, porters, and cleaners; and packers-shipping.
The separate wage data for men and women workers have been collected
for each city whenever available. The data for women are not as complete as
that for men, however, and in some instances the reported hourly earnings
may be suspect because of small sample size. The skill differential analysis
throughout the balance of this paper is restricted to men only; any exception
will be explicitly noted. The increased entry and retention of women in the
labor force starting in the mid-sixties may be most relevant to the behavior
of the men's labor skill differential in the non-manufacturing sector, and in
integration of the two sets of earnings data at some future date may provide
some interesting labor market observations.
The representative average annual wages of skilled workers and unskilled
workers are the reported median straight-time hourly earnings for each occu-
pation, weighed by the BLS estimate of the number of workers employed that
year in each respective occupation for the metropolitan area. The firms
surveyed are establishments with 50 or more employees, and the minimum
establishment size is 100 employees for manufacturing, public utilities, and
te B
37/
"36 I
retail trade in the 12 largest areas. Th ureau of Labor Statistics urges
caution in using these employment estimates,
of.
James N. Houff, "Improving Area Wage Survey Indexes," Monthly Labor
Review
,
96 (January 1973) pp. 52-56
37
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. BLS Handbook
o f Methods . Washington: GPO, 1971 p. 140
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The BLS suggests that these estimates are provided to serve only as general
guides to the size of the labor force included in each area survey. Nonetheless,
there seems to be no way to verify the BLS occupation estimates against the
U. S. Census occupation surveys, as the specifications for respective occupations
are significantly different in the two sources. I therefore have accepted the
BLS area employment estimates for each selected occupation as adequate for
purposes of weighing wages to derive a representative annual wage for skilled
labor and for unskilled labor in each metropolitan area.
The annual area wage surveys are not reported as of a uniform month for
all areas. Rather, the reporting months are scattered throughout the calendar
year for the various cities, and even a specific city might change its reporting
month over the twenty-two year period in this study. In order to facilitate
comparisons I selected Julyl, as the common annual date for all cities. I
have assumed that observed changes in wage data occured in smooth, equal
monthly increments between the two reporting periods and then adjusted the
reported wages in each instance to July 1. This smoothing transformation does
not seem to significantly affect the analysis, though I would suggest caution
in interpreting any one-year lags that seem to occur between price or unemploy-
ment changes and the labor skill differential. These lags for different cities
may in fact be a consequence of this process of adjustment to a uniform annual
date for analysis.
The price indexes for each labor market area are the SMSA consumer
price indexes on all items, 1950-73, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics. 387
38
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1974.
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The annual unemployment for each labor market area is from published sources
39/for the years 1959-73. The Washington office of the Department of Labor
provided unpublished worksheet data for the respective cities for 1950-58.
Again, the Department of Labor does urge caution in using these earlier-year
annual area unemployment estimates, but these are the most reliable area data
40/
available. The unemployment estimates in earlier years are adjusted for
the 1967 change in the definition of unemployment.
The availability of area wage data determine the length of the time-series
for each city. Most cities have reasonably complete data in the manufacturing
sector for the entire twenty-two year period, but Davenport-Moline and Houston
are added to the area wage surveys in the latter fifties or early sixties.
Somewhat fewer cities have complete data on the non-manufacturing sector for
the twenty- two year period, but nowhere in the analysis that follows does the
number of observed labor market areas in any specific instance fall below
twelve cities.
39
U. S. President, Manpower Report of the President. Washington GPO
Annual, 1963-73.
40
U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. How the
Government Measures Unemployment . Report 418. Washington; GPO, 1973.
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THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1952-73
The single, overriding feature of the aggregate, or pooled labor
skill differential in the manufacturing sector during this twenty-two year period
is its stability. The BLS now provides indexes of average hourly earnings
consolidated for all sampled metropolitan labor markets nationwide, recon-
structed back to 1960. One can apply these wage indexes to derive one estimate
of a national urban labor skill differential for men in manufacturing. These
aggregated annual manufacturing skill differentials appear on Table 1, to-
gether with complementary national unemployment and price data for the
fourteen years 1960-73.

Table 1 . Indexes of Average Hourly Earnings, 1967= 100
Manufacturing, Men. Skilled Maintenance, and Unskilled Plant.
24
Skill
.
Differential Total Kale CPI c/o
all UE UE Urban wage Change
~
Metro areas Rate Rate, % Earners In CPI
1960 1.0087 5.5 5.4 88.7 1.5
1961 1.0072 6.7 6.4 89.6 .7
1962 1.0035 5.5 5.2 90.6 1.2
1963 1.0011 5.7 5.2 91.7 1.6
1964 0.9978 5.2 4.6 92.9 1.2
1965 0.9935 4.5 4.0 94.5 1.9
1966 0.9979 3.8 3.2 97.2 3.4
1967 1.0000 3.8 3.1 100.0 3.0
1968 1.0019 3.6 2.9 104.2 4.7
1969 1.0063 3.5 2.8 109.8 6.1
19 70 1.0008 4.9 4.4 116.3 5.5
1971 0.9938 5.9 5.3 121.3 3.4
19 72 0.9899 5.6 4.9 125.3 3.4
1973 0.9884 4.9 4.1 133.1 8.8
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As I said earlier, Reder and Oi each offered hypotheses based on
competitive labor market models to postulate that the labor skill differ-
ential would widen during times of increasing unemployment and recession,
and that the skill differential would narrow as labor markets became very
tight approaching full employment. Neither Reder nor Oi placed much stress
on the sensitivity of the labor skill differential to moderate, short-run
changes in employment levels. Segal concentrated on this issue of manu-
facturing (men) skill differential responsiveness to changing unemployment
for four cities only (Atlanta, Chicago, New York, San Francisco) during
41/1951-61. Segal found the coefficient of correlation between the per-
centage change in the skill differential and the reciprocal of general
unemployment was -0.733 for Chicago. There was no significant association
between these variables for the other three cities. Segal concludes, "Never-
theless in view of the results pertaining to the other cities the reasonable
interpretation of the data must emphasize a lack of a clear pattern of short-
run fluctuations in the skill ratio (ed: skill differential) of manufacturing
workers during the 1950 's."
Other authors have presented hypotheses for the general stability
of wages overall in the manufacturing sector. The postulates that seem most
reasonable to this writer are grounded in the presence of the absence of
Competition both in key product markets and labor markets in the manufacturing
sector. Wachter (1970), and Ross and Wachter (1973), provide some insights
41
Martin Segal, op. cit. p. 200.
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on wage movements in a noncompetitive setting, though they do not directly
address the skill differential issue of rigid wage scales. Wachter does
suggest that unions interested in a certain minimum rate of wage increase
during loose labor markets, even at the expense of a somewhat slower rate of
42/
growth during tighter labor markets.
Ross and Wachter expand on this theme, though again concentrating
43/
on industrywide average wages rather than wage scales. The authors observe
that industries with price discretion have price structures that probably are
different than that which would prevail if the sector were competitive. Ross
and Wachter continue,
"In order to preserve the industry price structure, it is
necessary for the firms to develop an agreed upon method of
signaling when prices should change in response to changing
demand and cost conditions. .. .A traditional method for a-
chieving this reliability is to base prices on a markup on
certain standard costs that are both important in total
industry variable costs and nearly identical for all firms
in the industry: Thus, prices are often based on a markup
on wages. Unions can be helpful if industry-wide settle-
ments are the rule although the mere existance of a long-
term wage contract is not sufficient to ensure the desired
wage stability. For a long-term wage contract to have
operational significance, it is necessary that the contract
include a wage premium that will insulate the firm from
short-run changes in the economy=wide demand for labor.
If this were not the case, wage rates would have to be
adjusted frequently to reflect market forces, and the
advantage of stable administered prices would be lost.
On the other hand, with a wage premium the administered
firm hires workers off a queue. Fluctuations in product
demand and this in the derived demand for labor, cause
fluctuations in numbers hired off the queue but not in the
size of the money wage rate offered." 44/
42
Wachter, American Economic Review March 1970, op. cit. pp. 77-78
43
Ross and Wachter, op. cit. pp. 676-78.
44
Ibid. pp. 677-78,
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An aggregate national manufacturing skill differential that is
based on composite wage indexes may elude opposing compensating forces among
regions or based on other considerations. Other institutional issues such
as the impact of changing unionization cannot be effectively analyzed when
confronted with nationwide indexes. The productive alternative is to con-
struct annual skill differentials for select metropolitan labor market areas,
based on occupation wage and employment data in the area wage surveys.
The movement of the skill differential in the 16 sample cities
when pooled supports the general impressions of the aggregate differential
constructed from BLS nationwide wage indexes. A pooled model was used for
the 1952-73 period of the form:
Y = a
1
x., + a„ x.. + + a., x. . + 3i
i 1 ji 2 ji ..... 16 ji
Where i = 1, 2, ...., 22 years, 1952-73
x.. = o; or 1 for specific city intercept
j = 1, 2, ...., 16 identifier for cities
This form if pooled model for the 16 cities is necessitated by the
variations in the actual and estimated skill differential values among the
16 cities in 1952 = i . (This is an initial insight into the variations among
manufacturing skill differentials when one concentrates on comparisons among
cities. In 1952 Atlanta had the highest observed manufacturing skill differ-
ential at 1.7666; Cleveland was lowest at 1.3779). The estimated trend-value
of the manufacturing skill differential for each city in 1952 is given in
Table 2, together with the pooled value for the trend coefficient 3.
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Although the pooled twenty-two year time-trend coefficient for the
skill differential in manufacturing is negative and significant at .01, the
8 annual value is only -.0009. At this rate the pooled manufacturing skill
differential for the 16 cities would have declined less than 2 percent in
twenty-two years. One would be pressed to claim that the manufacturing
labor skill differential is continuing to secularly decline based on this
evidence. Rather, the data would seem to reinforce the stability hypo-
thesis.
We shall see in the non-manufacturing sector that the movement of
the skill differential breaks into two strong segments, 1952-64 and 1965-73.
My basic focal point is the impact of "pure inflation" on the labor skill
differential, and I identify the middle of 1965 as the relevant "full-employ-
ment and inflation" takeoff point. Therefore, it is relevant to pose the
question: Did the skill differentials in manufacturing respond differently
in the inflation period 1965-73 then in prior years?
Since the overall suspicion is that the manufacturing skill dif-
ferentials remain reasonably (and remarkably) stable regardless of shocks
to other economic parameters, one can apply a t-test for the difference in
pooled time slopes between the early period and the inflation period:
B -6
t
l
t
2
. n, .002506 _ ^ . . r . c„ - -T, = 1.87, not significant at 5% level
o o .001340
.S.E.
tl
- S.E.
t2
Where tl = 1952-64 period
t2 = 1965-73 period
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The pooled time slopes therefore are not significantly different in manu-
facturing between the two periods.
Another approach to analyze stability of labor skill differentials
in the manufacturing sector even in the face of sharp inflation is to examine
the relative stability for each of the cities. One can take the secular, linear
time trend for each city estimated 1952-64; and then compare extrapolated
predicted values of each respective city's manufacturing skill differential
in each year with the actual recorded values. For this test, Houston and
45/Detroit were eliminated because of data problems. For the 14 remaining
cities, 118 of 126 possible observations for 1965-73 fall within .95 confidence
bounds. In fact, all observed manufacturing skill differentials for this
period are within the confidence intervals in 11 of 14 cities. Cleveland
has one exceptional year, Los Angeles has three such years, and Dallas has
four years where the observed skill differential is outside the extrapolated
linear time-trend confidence intervals. Whatever the secular trends for each
city in the manufacturing sector, then, the skill differentials are extremely
stable.
I tested for relationships between changing unemployment or
changing price levels on manufacturing skill differentials for each city, both
1/1952-64 and 1965-73, using the basic model D=D( U ,P) thirteen different
45
Houston has only four annual observations before 1965, and
Detroit has missing wage data for four years during the period.
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possible combinations of lags. As one would anticipate from the above
discussion, the results were insignificant or inconclusive. The best predictor
cbaniong the straight-lag and distributed-lag functions was D = a + 3-, (7 ) +3 P_
_i
—
*
but even most-preferred lag equations, 3D ,~ is insignificant (at .05) in
the majority of tested cities for both periods. Likewise the response of
the manufacturing skill differentials to changes in the annual rate of
inflation either is insignificant for some cities throughout the twenty-two
year periods or the cities offset each other. I made no attempt to correct
for any serial correlation that may be present; manufacturing skill differ-
entials for the 16 cities are simply too stable with regard to changing
unemployment or prices to merit further five tuning.
Though the manufacturing skill differentials in the sample cities
are relatively insensitive to short-run changes in economic conditions, the
secular trends in 9 of the 16 cities result in interesting convergence
points. The estimated skill differentials are illustrated for 1952 and 1973.
2
The low R 's and insignificant beta coefficients for 7 cities simply reinforce
the secular stability of the manufacturing skill differentials for these cities.
In 8 of the 9 instances of secular change, the cities are converging to one of
two points. The ninth city—Minneapolis—alternatively has widened secularly
to approach the 1973 mean-value of manufacturing skill differentials for the 16
cities.
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Table 3. Secular Trend Analysis of the Manufacturing
Skill Differential in 16 Cities, 1952-73.
Dji + BJi 1,2 22 years
Est. Skill B, Annual Est. Skill
R
2
ID// and City Differential Time- trend Differential,
1952 at
Si
.05
gnificance
1973
1. Atlanta 1.7434 - .0056 1.6236 .32 7
2. Boston 1.5230 1.5230 .017
3. Chicago 1.5696 .0016 1.6056 .278
4. Los Angeles 1.4483 .0060 1.5797 .745
5. New York 1.7104 - .0054 1.5914 .636
6. St. Louis 1.6326 - .0081 1.4534 .887
7. Philadelphia 1,5318 - .0036 1.4515 .610
8. Detroit 1.3929 1,3929 .105
9. Cleveland 1.3842 1.3842 .141
10. Houston 1.6518 1.6518 .015
11. Quad Cities 1.4450 1.4450 .054
12. Dallas 1.6864 1.6864 .000
13. Minneapolis 1.4753 <.0023 1.5263 .533
14. Milwaukee 1.4802 1.4802 .000
15. San Francisco 1.39 70 i.0016 1.4312 .402
16. Cincinnatti 1.6 701 — .0095 1.4607 .669
X; 1.5464 1.5179

The secular time-trend of the manufacturing skill differentials for each
of the 16 cities and the mean-value for these cities are illustrated in DIAGRAM
1. MANUFACTURING SKILL DIFFERENTIALS FOR 16 SELECT CITIES (LINEAR TRENDS);
1952-73.
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Four of the cities with some secular change in the manufacturing
skill differential during 1952-73 appear to be converging about Point A ~ 1.60
Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Four other cities tend to
converge at Point B ~ 1.45 : Cincinnatti, St. Louis, Philadelphia; and San
Francisco. The movements of individual cities appear more meaningful in the
context of the convergence points. Though the manufacturing skill differ-
ential for San Francisco has widened over the twenty- two year period; this
city maintains its ranking of the third-lowest skill differential in this
sector among the 16 cities. Moreover, the rate of expansion for the San
Francisco skill differential is such to bring it close to the same values
for 4 other cities—three of which are converging to D. = 1.45 and the Quad
Cities which essentially remained at this value. The 8 cities with con-
vergence trends are illustrated in Diagram 2.
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Diagram 2 MANUFACTURING
SKILL DIFFERENTIALS FOR
8 CITIES SECURLARLY CONVERGING,
1952-73
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One plausible hypothesis for the skill differential changes that
did occur between 1952 and 1973 is the increased presence of unionization
and national, industry-wide collective bargaining agreements that has resulted
in a clustering effect for select cities.
The BLS publishes estimates of the percent of plantworkers in area
wage survey cities who are employed in establishments in which a contract (s)
46/
covered a majority of workers. This percent of collective bargaining
coverage is not necessarily synonymous with the strength of unions and con-
sequent capacities to achieve target-demands. Nonetheless, the BLS survey does
provide an index of unionization. The average annual collective bargaining
coverage of manufacturing plantworkers between July 1968 and June 1972 is
illustrated in table 4, together with the cities' trend-estimate (not actual)
1973 manufacturing skill differentials.
The four cities with the highest manufacturing skill differentials
in 1973 — Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, and Chicago — each have "indexes of
unionization" of less than 75.0. The cities with a lower union profile are
tending nationwide to cluster about a mean manufacturing skill differential
for their group which is about 10 percent above the overall U. S. average for
the 16 cities.
46
U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Area Wage
Surveys-Selected metropolitan Areas . Annual summary bulletin at conclusion
of each year. E.g. Bulletin 1725-95, September 1973; Appendix table 4.
Also Bulletin 1660-90, November 1970; Table 3.
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On the other hand, the four cities with the lowest, or most narrow
1973 manufacturing skill differentials — Cleveland, Detroit, San Francisco,
and the Quad Cities — have 89.5 or higher "indexes of unionization." The
eight cities below the mean skill differential decidedly are the "more-union"
cities. The central tendency value of the lower convergence point B is 1.45,
or 5 percent below the 16-city mean.
Table 4. Indexes of Unionization , and 1973 Manufacturing
Skill Differentials for Selected Cities
ID// and city,
in descending order
by 1973 D
12
.
Dallas
10. Houston
1. Atlanta
3. Chicago
5. New York
4. Los Angeles
13. Minneapolis
12. Boston
14 Milwaukee
16. Cincinnatti
6. St. Louis
7. Philadelphia
11. Quad Cities
15. San Francisco
8. Detroit
9 Cleveland
Adj. 1973 1968-72
skill index of
differential unionization
1.6864 52.0
1.6518 67.0
1.6236 69.5
1.6056 74.5
1.5914 84.5
1.5797 69.5
1.5263 79.5
1.5230 64.5
1.5179
1.4802 92.0
1.4607 72.0
1.4534 92.0
1.4515 87.0
1.4450 92.0
1.4312 94.5
1.3929 97.0
1.3842 89.5
The average annual percent of manufacturing plantworkers is establish-
ments in which a collective bargaining contract(s) covered a majority
of workers, 1968-72.

DIAGRAM 3. RELATIONSHIPS OF 1973 MANUFACTURING SKILL
DIFFERENTIALS AND INDEXES OF UNIONIZATION
FOR 16 SELECT CITIES.
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Melvin Reder postulated in 1955 that considerations attendant to
geographic regions would explain any variance in manufacturing skill dif-
47/ferentials among metropolitan labor markets, Reder commented, "If this
theory is correct, then one would expect that, within the United States, the
South-where semiskilled manufacturing jobs are relatively infrequent, rain-
inum educational standards are low, and racial prejudice acts as a barrier
to substitution of unskilled negroes for skilled whites - would be an area
where the skill margin would be relatively high. In the Far West where
minimum educational standards are relatively high, where negroes and foreign
immigrants are relatively infrequent, and where females and children are an
unusually small part of the labor force, one would expect to find a relatively
high degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor and,
consequently, a narrow skill margin. And, as is generally known, the skill
margin is higher in the South and lower in the Far West than in any of the
48/
other parts of the United States."
The 1953 rankings among the 16 cities would tend to support Reder 1 s
hypothesis. But the more significant secular changes that have occurred
in the subsequent twenty-two years now would seem to challenge his "regional"
perspective. The manufacturing skill differentials of Concinnatti and St.
Louis - two cities with broad union representation - narrowed sufficiently
47
Reder, American Economise Review (December, 1955) op.cit.;pp. 846-47,
48
Ibid. p. 847.
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to cross below the 1973 skill differential average for all 16 cities. Los
Angeles rose secularly, on the other hand, at a rate sufficient to cross the
16-city average and converge with the wider skill differentials of the less-
unionized cities. New York City—a 1953 anomaly among Northeast, more-unionized
cities—did register a secular decline to a more reasonable ranking, though
at a rate less than Cincinnatti and St. Louis. Likewise, the skill differ-
ential of Philadelphia narrowed between 1952 and 1973 to a level that more
closely reflects the index of unionization for that metropolitan labor market.
Reder preferred to work out from his basic premise of competitive
labor markets to explain variations in labor skill differentials. I prefer
to stress the noncompetitive product and labor markets in the manufacturing
sector as the structural framework affecting skill differentials. Specif-
ically the labor unions in concert with the large, national manufacturing
corporations are the pervasive forces contributing both to the aggregate, or
pooled stability of the manufacturing skill differential nationwide, and to
the secular changes and variations that are observed among individual cities
.

41.
THE NON-MANUFACTURING SECTOR
,
1952-64 AND 1965-73
The performance of the labor skill differentials in the non-manu-
facturing sector stand in sharp contrast with manufacturing skill differ-
entials over this twenty-two year period. Overall skill differentials in
the non-manufacturing sector widened so dramatically with the onset of
rising inflation in 1965 that the analysis of this sector must be discussed
in the framework of two periods. This sudden turn of events in 1965 with a
decided widening of skill differentials is observed in twelve of the four-
teen cities with relatively complete time-series wage and employment data
49/for the non-manufacturing sector. The average individual city increase
in non-manufacturing skill differential was 18 percent for the 1964-73
49
Milwaukee and the Quad Cities lack non-manufacturing wage data
for many of the years, but may be included in some pooled models where degrees
of freedom and sequential-year observations permit. Generally we are limited
to 14 non-manufacturing cities
.
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nine-year period, ranging from 4 percent to a high of 27 percent.
If the "pure inflation" effect can be isolated, the significant
widening of skill differentials in this sector would contradict the casual
conjectures of Hicks, Perlman, and others previously discussed. To the
extent that 1966-70 were wartime years, the widening of the labor skill dif-
ferential in the non-manufacturing sector would contradict the findings of
Evans during the Civil War, and World Wars I and II. Moreover, the five
years 1965 through 1969 is the longest continuous full-employment-and in-
flation period available for analysis.
The "non-manufacturing sector" as defined by BLS includes trans-
portation; communication and other public utilities; wholesale trade; retail
trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services. The government
sector is excluded, as are construction and the extractive industries. This
non-manufacturing sector has been largely ignored in relative wage studies;
though continued avoidance cannot be justified in consideration both of the
absolute and growing importance of this sector.
Certainly the conceptualization of skilled workers and unskilled
workers employed together in the same productive process is not as clear in
The BLS annual national unemployment rates were equal to or less
than 4.0 percent throughout this period, in spite of a mini-recession in early
1967 and the start of a second mini-recession in latter 1969.
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the non-manufacturing sector as it might be in one's image of a manufac-
turing firm. The presence of unskilled workers in non-manufacturing is
acknowledged, but skilled workers somehow seem to blend into the surroundings
The 1970 Census provides one basis for appreciating the numbers of skilled
workers in this non-manufacturing sector. The category "craftsmen and
kindred workers" is representative of what is commonly understood as skilled
workers and includes occupations such as carpenters, electricians, mechanics,
machinists, and stationary engineers. Of the 10.1 million craftsmen and
kindred workers, the manufacturing sector accounts for 3.6 million such
workers and construction another 2.6 million such skilled or journeymen
workers. Eliminating government, agriculture, extractive, and other ex-
cluded categories, the U, S. Census indicates that there are 3.4 million
craftsmen and kindred workers in the "non-manufacturing" sector so defined.
This is almost the same number of skilled workers as in the manufacturing
sector, and the concepts of relative wages, wage scales, or skill margins
are appropriate to both sectors.
I will demonstrate more precisely that the non-manufacturing skill
differentials 1952-73 must be treated as two periods, when post-1964 data
are introduced. But what of the skill differential movements in this sec-
tor between 1952 and 1964? Rather than discussing changing median values,
one can apply a pooled time-series model of the form:
U. S. Census. Occupation By Indus try-19 70 . PC(2)-7C. Washington
GPO, 1971. Table 1.
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Y
i
= a
l
xji + a 2 xji + + a15 Xji + Si
shere i = 1,2,.... 13 years; 1952-64
x
.
= o; or 1 for specific city interceptm
j = 1,2,.... 15 identifier for cities.
The results are illustrated in Table 4.
The pooled time-trend beta coefficient is not significant, indicating
an overall absence of any pronounced narrowing or widening trend in the non-
manufacturing skill differential during 1952-63. When one studies the patterns
of change in the skill differentials for the individual cities during this
period, the scene is more mixed than the two-point convergence theorem
postulated for the naufacturing sector. The linear time-trends for the
skill differentials in the respective cities are reproduced in Table 5.
Though non-linear transformations would improve the fit in a few cities,
the overall conclusions remain unchanged.
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Table 5. Non-Manufacturing
Time Trends 1952-64
D. = a + bT
J
City a b R*
Atlanta 1.6953 .0347 .857
** **.0043 SE.058
Boston 1.5537 .0083 .399
** **.0031 SE.041
Chicago 1.7330 - .0024 .153
**
.0017 SE.023
Los Angeles 1.7749 - .0081 .500
** **.0025 SE.033
New York 1.5688 .0028 .059
**
.0034 SE.046
St. Louis 1.5537 .0017 .001
**
.0250 SE.105
Philadelphia 1.6101 .0030 .172
** *.0020 SE.027
Detroit 1.8333 - .0185 .644
** **.0069 SE.029
Cleveland 1.8828 .0181 .968
** **.0010 SE.013
Houston insufficient data
Dallas 1.7761 .0028 .049
**
.0037 Se.049
Minneapolis 1.6918 .0177 .872
** **.0021 SE.028
Milwaukee insufficient data
San Francisco 1.3779 .0057 .245
** **.0030 SE.041
Cincinnatti 2.0336 - .0180 .627
** **.0080 SE.025
**: coefficient is .05 significant
When one discusses the issue of possible convergence of skill
differentials in the non-manufacturing sector, Atlanta. distorts the overall
picture. The non-manufacturing skill differential in Atlanta has widened
consistently and dramatically over the entire twenty- two year period, from
a 1952 observed value of 1.7455 to a 2.6353 value in 1973. The next-highest
1973 observed non-manufacturing skill differential is 2.3244 for Houston.
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Using the secularly-e3timated values for skill differentials in each
city in 1952 and again in 1964, the results are as follows with Atlanta
included:
A
HON-MFG.
D;
No. of
Year Cities Mean Deviation Variance Skewnesn
1952 15 1.6982 0.1742 .0303 .0546
1964 15 1.6860 0.2010 .0404 .9370
With Atlanta removed, the remaining 14 cities reflect the following
changes in relative variation between 1952 and 1964:
Non-iafg.
Year
1952
1964
No. of
Cities
14
14
Mean
1.6984
1.6531
Standard
Deviation
0.1803
0.1643
Variance
.0325
.0270
Skewness
.0494
.8660
Though some skewness is present in 1964 toward higher values
(even with Atlanta excluded) , there is an observed tendency for the variance
among non-manufacturing skill differentials in the 14 remaining cities to be
less than in 1952. The four cities with the widest estimated non-manufacturing
skill differentials in 1964 are Atlanta, Concinnatti, Houston, and Dallas.
The three cities clustered about the narrowest estimated non-manufacturing
skill differentials are San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis; Beyond
these observations, it is difficult to discern any other pronounced secular
movements in the non-manufacturing sector between 1952 and 1964.
Abstracting from secular movements in those seven cities exhibi-
ting such changes, the 1952-64 non-manufacturing skill differentials are more
prone to annual fluctuations than in the manufacturing sector. This
volatility generally is common among the 14 non-manufacturing cities during
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this period, but no single predictive pattern for changes in the respective
skill differentials can be discerned. Differences in sampling, reporting,
and data transformation may contribute to some element in these annual
fluctuations,but in comparison with the manufacturing sector—I must conclude
that the labor skill differential is more susceptible to shocks of changing
labor market conditions and general economic considerations during "normal"
times of moderate swings in employment, profits and prices.
This brings us to 1965, when non-manufacturing skill differentials
responded dramatically to the increase in the rate of inflation. The skill
differential widened sharply since 1964 in 12 of the 14 cities with adequate
non-manufacturing sector wage and employment data. New York and Detroit
are the two contraditions; in each of these cities the skill differential in
this sector narrowed.
The sharp contrast in overall performance of labor skill differ-
entials in non-manufacturing in the two periods 1952-64 and 1965-73 can be
appreciated by an analysis of the changes that occurred as the economy
approached full-employment plus accelerated inflation. A pooled model again
can be utilized to test whether the aggregate time-trend coefficients were
significantly different between the two periods. Unlike the manufacturing
sector where there was no significant statistical difference in the pooled
time-trend coefficient in the thirteen years preceding 1965 and in sub-
52/
sequent years, the t-test for the non-manufacturing sector reveals:
52
New York, Detroit, and the Quad Cities are excluded from the original
16 cities for this purpose of testing time-trend slopes. Milwaukee had an
adequate number of observations for inclusion in a pooled model. In each instance
the individual intercepts were set at 1951=0 for this t-test exercise only.
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3 . - B -.000244 - .030799
t2 m
\/s.E. 2 - S.E. 2 y(.001596) 2 + (.002851) 2
* tl t2
-.031043
— m _95Q . significant: at 1% ievel>
.003267
where tl = 1952-64 period
t2 = 1965-73 period
A separate pooling for non-manufacturing sector cities 1965-73 was
calculated, with i = 1964, in order to derive more reasonable estimates of
o '
intercept values for each respective city. Also, the maximum number of
cities with reasonable number of observations were pooled, when this latter
period is considered separate from the preceding thirteen years. The pooled
model takes the form:
Y, = a, x.. + a^ x.. + + a,. x #J + 3ii 1 ji 2 ji 14 ji
where i = 1,2, ,9 years; 1965-73
x =0; or 1 for specific city intercept
j = 1,2, 14 identifier for cities
New York and Detroit were excluded from the non-manufacturing sector
pooled data and will be separately analyzed. When grouped, the fourteen re-
maining sample cities in Table 6 demonstrate strong reinformcing qualities
2
(R =.914) in the widening of the skill differential in this sector with the
outset of rising inflation. The highly-significant nine-year pooled time-trend
beta coefficient for these 14 cities is .0302; with the actual median skill
differential of the eleven cities with complete 1965-73 non-manufacturing wage
data increasing from 1.70 in 1965 to 2.01 in 1973.
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Diagram 4. Non-manufacturing Skill Differentials (Men Only)
for Select Cities, 1962-73
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Diagram 4, continued
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Diagram 4, continued
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2.0
1.9
1.8
1.7 St. Louis
1.6
1.5
62 65 69 73
1.8
1.7
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delphia
62 65 69 73

Diagram 4, continued
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Cleveland
62 65 69 73
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
Houston
62 65 69 73

Diagram 4, continued
1.9
1.8
62 65 69
Dallas
73
1.7
1.6 Minneapolis
1.5
62 65 69 73
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1.5 Milwaukie
62 65 69
1.6
1.5
San
Francisco
62 65 69 73
Cincinnati
62 65 69 73
'
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I then expressly tested for the sensitivity of the non-manufacturing
skill differential to changes in unemployment and to changes in the inflation
rate. Distributed lag functions were not productive; normal lag functions
produce the most acceptable results. Again, four separate combinations of
single-year lags are employed, and the most meaningful lag equation is
illustrated for each city. I must again stress the rationale for selecting
from among four lag equations. The annual wage and employment data are
reported in different months among the sample cities. I did smooth the data
in adjusting each observed month to a universal July 1 observation date for
all cities. I therefore have some reservations in attaching any empirical
significance to the presence or absence of a one-year lag in response by
the non-manufacturing skill differential to changing unemployment or
inflation in any specific city. Though the equation of the form
D = a + B (1/u) + B P would provide acceptable values in each of the 12
cities, overall considerations suggest the best-fit equation regardless of
purported one-year lag differences.
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Table 7. Response of Non-manufacturing Labor Skill Differential to Changes
in Unemployment and Changes in Inflation Rates for Selected
Cities, 1965-73
Estimating Equation
and City
Changing
Unemployment
u"
1
Changing
Inflation Rates,
R
D-W
D = D (1/u, P)
Philadelphia -.0056
(.0011)
D =
•
D (i/u, P_
x
)
Dallas -.0026
(.0008)
D = D I(l/u)_r P]
Boston -.0129
(.0037)
Chicago -.0140
(.0049)
Los Angeles -.0256
(.0065)
St. Louis .0047
(.0036)
Minneapolis -.0051
(.0009)
San Francisco -.0075
(.0029)
Cincinnatti -.0254
(.0082)
D =
•
D [(i/u)_
x
,
P_
x
]
Atlanta -.0301
(.0088)
Cleveland -.0104
(.0032)
Houston -.0078
(.0058)
.0043
(.0020)
.0134
(.0053)
.0510
(.0136)
.610
(.0188)
.0853
(.0178)
.0533
(.0149)
.0367
(.0059)
.0339
(.0069)
.0777
(.0345)
.0534
(.0259)
.0318
(.0120)
.0587
(.0300)
.363
2.16
.741
2.68
.786
1.82
.726
2.03
.823
1.37
.714
1.99
.892
2.28
.810
1.48
.658
2.10
.707
1.74
.695
1.61
.403
2.07
Note: All unemployment coefficients are significant at .05, except
St. Louis and Houston. All price level change coefficients are
significant at .05. Values in parentheses are standard errors
of coefficient.
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The estimated positive relationships between the increase in the
inflation rate since 1965 and the widening of the non-manufacturing skill
differential is significant at the .05 confidence level in each of the 12
cities. The resultant statistical correlation between changing unemployment
and the non-manufacturing skill differential during this period also is
interesting. In 10 cities the reciprocal-of-unemployment beta coefficient
is negative and significant at .05, implying — ceteris paribus — that the
labor skill differential would continue to narrow as labor markets grew in-
creasingly tighter, and vice versa. This reaffirmation of the Reder and Oi
hypotheses in competitive labor markets together with minimal serial correla-
tion both further support the "pure inflation" effect findings in 12 of the
14 non-manufacturing sector cities.
This leaves New York and Detroit as the two sample cities where
the non-manufacturing skill differential continued to narrow during 1965-73.
The actual skill differentials for these two cities are illustrated in
Diagram 5.
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Diagram 5. Non-manufacturing Skill Differentials (Men Only)
For New York and Detroit, 1962-73
1.6
1.5
New
York
62 65 69 73
1.8
1.7 Detroit
1.6
62 65 69 73
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The estimating equations for these two cities yielded the following
results:
Estimating Equation
and City
Changing
Unemployment
,
U
Changing
Inflation Rates,
R
D-W
D = D [(i/u)_r P_x ]
New York
D = D [(i/u)_r P]
Detroit
.0041
(.0013)
.0054
(.0015)
-.0159
(.0030)
-.0333
(.0077)
.843
2.90
.847
2.70
All beta coefficients are significant at the .05 confidence interval. Note
that the signs are universally reversed for these two "deviant" cities. New
York and Detroit are so noticeably different from the other 12 cities that
their inclusion in any post-1964 pooling exercises severely distorts the
statistical analysis.
The plausible determinants of a continued narrowing of the non-
manufacturing skill differentials in New York and Detroit are conjectural at
this time, though a detailed look at relative wage changes may provide some
insight. The secular changes in the non-manufacturing skill differentials
for these two cities can best be appreciated when compared with relative values
and movements in their respective manufacturing skill differentials.
New York is an anomaly among the 15 cities (Quad Cities excluded)
with adequate time-series data on both sectors, in that the manufacturing skill
differential consistently is larger, or wider than the non-manufacturing
skill differential throughout the twenty- two year period. The New York manu-
facturing skill differential of 1.71 in 1952 is exceptionally high, given
region and unionization considerations, though this skill margin declines
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secularly 1952-73. The 1952 non-manufacturing skill differential of 1.56
placed New York well below the median at 11th of 15 cities in descending order.
This city's non-manufacturing skill differential is relatively volatile, with
annual jumps about a relatively stable ten-year mean-value, so that New York
did not change its ranking in the non-manufacturing sector.
The New York skill differentials for the two sectors almost converged
in 1963, with a sharp narrowing of the manufacturing skill differential and
a corresponding widening of the skill margin in non-manufacturing sector during
that year. From this point — which represents an abnormal high for the non-
manufacturing sector — each respective skill differenti?l has declined secularly
the last ten years such that the New York manufacturing skill differential
remains about 5 percent greater than its non-manufacturing counterpart.
Detroit's manufacturing skill differential performance stands in
contrast to that of New York. Detroit and Cleveland together have the narrowest
manufacturing skill differentials during the entire 1952-73 period, that remain
stable throughout the twenty-two years. The Detroit 1952 non-manufacturing
skill differential at 1.83 was exceptionally high for a highly industrialized,
unionized city. At the outset Detroit's non-manufacturing skill differential
ranked 4th highest among the 15 cities (Quad Cities excluded). It is not
surprising that Detroit registered the greatest secular rate of decline in
non-manufacturing skill differentials 1952-64, so that at the end of this
first period Detroit ranked 10th among the 15 cities in descending order.
The continued decline in the non-manufacturing skill differentials for Detroit
and New York during 1965-73 against the countervailing trend of all other
sample cities resulted in their ranking as the lowest (narrowest) among the
cities for this sector in 1973.
One can disaggregate the data still further and examine relative
wage changes themselves. Here one can isolate the relevant difference between
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New York and Detroit on one hand, and 13 other cities. When one takes the
ratio of median annual unskilled wages in the manufacturing sector-to-the
median annual unskilled wages in the non-manufacturing sector, New York and
Detroit are the only 2 cities among the 13 so-tested where the ratio declines
between 1964 and 1973. In other words, the rate of increase in money wages
of unskilled workers in the non-manufacturing sector were greater than for
their counterparts in the manufacturing sector during this period. One
plausible explanation is that the rate of increase in unionization of unskilled
workers in non-manufacturing — specifically janitors — has been such in
these two cities that this increase in collective bargaining has caused the
rate of increase in median wages among the unskilled in this sector to exceed
the rate increase in manufacturing.
DETERMINANTS OF WIDENING NON-MANUFACTURING SKILL DIFFERENTIALS, 1965-73 .
New York and Detroit aside, what caused the non-manufacturing skill
differentials in the other 12 cities to widen so abruptly during 1965-73? I
suggest two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct orientation but neither
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of which is mutually exclusive. One or the other of these postulated condi-
i
tions may be dominant, but both may be present to reinforce the non-manu-
facturing skill differential's widening during tight labor market-and-inflation
conditions.
One plausible hypothesis to explain the sharply-widening non-
manufacturing skill differentials during 1965-73 is what I would term a
"skill-link" wage relationship among skilled workers in both sectors that
does not carry over to unskilled workers. This is a non-competitive labor
market setting, in which three of the corners of the parallelogram or directly
or secondarily linked through collective bargaining during this inflationary
period, while unskilled workers in the non-manufacturing sector stand apart
without monopsonistic wage negotiation leverage. A second hypothesis stresses
the consequences of stronger competitive elements in the non-manufacturing
sector, where decidedly different excess demand elasticities result in
corresponding different rates of wage increases between skilled workers and
unskilled workers.
Each of these hypotheses can be examined with regard to labor
market conditions and relative wage change in the two sectors. I can best
illustrate the overall wage relationships as a parallelogram, with the manu-
facturing wage scale as the left vector and non-manufacturing wages to the
right:
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Diagram 6. Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Wage Relationships Within
A Labor Market (SMSA)
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During the crucial period 1965-73, the labor skill differential in the manu-
facturing sector maintained its relative stability. The money wages of
skilled workers (W_,) and unskilled workers (W ) therefore were increasing
at approximately the same rates in manufacturing. In the non-manufacturing
sector and the right of the parallelogram, however, the labor skill differential
has widened sharply over this latter nine-year period.
What are the changing relative wage relationships in each of 15
cities between the two sectors during this dynamic inflation period? Several
permutations are possible. The money wages of skilled workers in non-manu-
facturing may have increased at a greater rate than their counterparts in
manufacturing, though wage relationships among unskilled workers in both
sectors remained relatively stable. Or, wage increases among skilled workers
in both sectors were of equal rates, while the wages of manufacturing unskilled
workers increased at a higher rate than the unskills in non-manufacturing.
Or, the rates of increases in 1965-73 wages for both skilled and unskilled
workers in manufacturing exceeded their counterparts in non-manufacturing,
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through within the latter sector the skilled workers fared somewhat better
with greater percentage wage increases than their unskilled non-manufacturing
brethren. Each of these possible relationships must be examined with regard
to the two proposed hypotheses.
The skill-link hypothesis draws its origins from Arthur Ross'
53/
"coercive comparisons" and "consolidated bargaining" in linked labor markets.
Ross stressed the interunion competitiveness and the advantages of multi-
employer collective bargaining in determining relatively stable interindustry
wage structures. Butler and Kim in turn concentrate on more specific (and
more relevant to this study) facets of relative wages: the dynamics of
54/
occupation wage structures. These authors argue that the metropolitan
wage structure of a reasonably homogeneous occupation such as machinists
or electricians is not a set of random numbers, but rather has a strucutre
among industries that is shaped by local considerations and tends to have
the same configureation year after year. Butler and Kim propose their
"steel spring" hypothesis: given a shock that may momentarily upset the
normal metropolitan occupation wage structure, the shape of the normal con-
figuration will determine responding wage changes that will restore the wage
structure to its normal configuration. The authors acknowledge that their
53
Arthur M. Ross. Trade Union Wage Policy , Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1948. pp. 50-52; 64-68.
Arthur Butler and Kye Kim, "The Dynamics of Wage Structures,"
Southern Economic Journal , 39 (April, 1973) pp. 588-600.
55
Ibid. pp. 588-89.
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hypothesis is consistent with the concept of coercive comparison but argue
that wage structures could act like steel springs even without the inter-
vention of unions. They observed wage structures of machinists and electricians
in 15 cities for 1951-69, but did not test for unskilled blue-collar workers.
Butler and Kim found some results favorable to their basic hypothesis in the
Northeast and North-central cities, plus San Francisco; but not in the South
or the balance of the West (Note: the less-unionized cities).
Butler and Kim restricted their analysis to industries in the manu-
facturing sector; my "skill link" hypothesis would bridge manufacturing and
non-manufacturing. Skilled workers in both sectors could be directly linked
by common craft unions and multi-employer bargaining, or indirectly linked
by coercive comparison. The median skilled workers' wage rates need not be
equal in each city for the two sectors; Ross and Wachter noted that the
56/
administered sector deliberately pays wage premiums. Whatever the rates
of skilled workers 1 wages in manufacturing to the wages of skilled workers
in non-manufacturing, this relationship would remain relatively stable under
my "skill link" hypothesis.
In other words, fixed attitudes to maintain rigid wage scales
within industrial unions in the manufacturing sector would be a dominant
force behind the relatively stable manufacturing skill differentials. The
"skill link" would join three of the four respective labor forces. Negotiated
settlements and the "skill link" result in wage rate increases that exceed
the isolated, competitive labor markets for unskilled workers in the non-
manufacturing sector.
S6
Ross and Wachter, op. cit. pp. 676-78.
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Diagram 7. The "Skill Link" Among Administered Elements in a Labor Market
(SMSA)
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One test of the "skill link" hypothesis is to examine the stability
of relative wages between skilled workers in the two sectors during 1965-73.
A strong link would be indicated by no significant changes in relative wages
over the nine years. Alternatively, the rate of money wage increases in the
labor markets for manufacturing skilled workers could be greater than their
non-manufacturing counterparts if unions dominate wage changes during inflation
and there is a greater percentage of union workers among the skilled in manu-
facturing than non-manufacturing. The first data column on Table 7 illustrates
the trend of secular changes in the relative wage relationships among skilled
workers in the two sectors.
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Table 7. Intersectoral Wage Relationships Between Skilled Workers, and Between
Unskilled Workers in the Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Sectors;
1964-73
WM/WN = a + $i; i = 1, 2, ..., 9: 1964-73 years
City
Median Manufacturing Skill Wage Median Manufacturing Unskilled Wage
Median Non-Mfg. Skill Wage Median Non-Mfg. Unskilled Wage
Atlanta -.0215
Boston -.0112
Chicago -.0147
Los Angeles -.0051
New York -.0078
St. Louis -.0145
Philadelphia -.0127
Detroit -.0029
Cleveland -.0158
Houston -.0244
Dallas -.0081
Minneapolis -.0051
Milwaukee not sign
San Francisco -.0065
Cincinnatti not sign
.0188
.0163
.0103
.0118
-.0084
not sign.
not sign,
-.0198
not sign,
not sign,
.0080
.0080
.0163
not sign,
.0288
Note: The beta coefficients illustrated are accepted at .05 or less probability
(in tail).
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The negative beta coefficients in 13 of the 15 illustrated cities
indicate that the secular rates of increase in money wages of skilled workers
in non-manufacturing exceeded the corresponding rates of increase in the
manufacturing sector. This interpretation of the data would seem to contradict
the "skill link" hypothisis that non-competitive forces link the union-dominated
workers in the manufacturing sector with skilled workers in the non-manu-
facturing sector. Rather, disproportionate rates of increase in wages of
skilled workers in the non-manufacturing sector compliments the competitive-
non-competitive sector dichtomy of Ross and Wachter — where the competitive
sector (e.g. non-manufacturing) must increase its relative wage to attract
labor from the queue of the high wage, administered sector in order to expand
productive output.
This analysis of relative wage changes does not preclude the presence
of skill links between the two sectors. Indeed the skilled worker wage
relationships were most stable in the mo re-unionized cities of Milwaukee,
Detroit, and Cincinnatti* and least stable in Houston and Atlanta. But the
data do suggest that the alternative hypothesis which focuses on competitive
labor market forces throughout the non-manufacturing sector may be more pro-
ductive in explaining the widening skill differentials in non-manufacturing
during full-employment and inflation.
The two-sector competitive labor market hypothesis is a variation
of the methodological framework of Reder and Oi. These latter authors assumed
the presence of a single productive sector and analyzed relative wage changes
in the context of vertical worker mobility between the skilled and unskilled
Ross and Wachter, op. cit. p. 686.
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labor markets. The relative supply elasticities of unskilled workers were
significantly less than skilled workers as one approached full employment,
and Reder and Oi agreed that under these conditions a narrowing of the skill
differential will result.
This alternative two-sector model assumes union-dominated, rigid
wage scales and secular wage premiums in the administered manufacturing sector,
I postulate that horizontal skilled labor mobility between sectors is more
important than training and upgrading within the non-manufacturing sector
in the short run; that an increase in wages sufficient to attract skilled
workers from the manufacturing sector queues or payrolls is more efficient
than the training costs and longer-term obligations incurred in upgrading
unskilled workers.
The widening of the non-manufacturing skill differential is rein-
forced by the relatively high elasticity of supply of individuals in the
market for unskilled workers during so-called "full employment" and
inflation. This is not a contradiction of Reder and Oi, but rather is an
empirical question regarding specifications of "full employment". Both
Reder and Oi understate the impact of the reserve labor force on the different
labor markets during times of tightening labor conditions and combined with
rising inflation. Clearly the increased vacancy rates associated with tight
labor markets are an encouragement to secondary workers, principally women
and youth. But inflation itself may be a separate factor attracting active
labor force participation among secondary workers. Wachter implies this
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attraction in his discussion of maintenance of household standards of living
„, 58/
over time.
An application of Johnston's income tax-net wage theory can reinforce
59/
this "pure inflation 1 ' attraction to the labor reserves. Johnston and
58
Michael L. Wachter, Review of Economics and Statistics , 1972; op .
cit . Wachter states, "The variable W/W* as a relative standard of living
variable, may also have direct effects on labor force participation as well.
For example, when past wages (as a proxy for desired current levels) are high
relative to present wages, all secondary workers, but especially wives, may
be tempted to sacrifice leisure and enter the labor market, thus supplementing
their family's income." p. 143.
This pure-inflation effect on the secondary labor force is also
implied (though not specified) in Ralph E. Smith, "Dynamic Determinants of
Labor Force Participation; Some Evidence from Gross Change Data," The Urban
Institute, Working Paper 350-49. August 14, 1973. p. 15.
59
J. Johnston and M. Timbrell, "Empirical Tests of a Bargaining
Theory of Wage Rate Determination", Manchester School of Economic and Social
Studies, 41(June, 1973) pp. 141-168.
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Timbrell note the Impact of inflation on after-tax wages under an income tax
system where increasing increments of income are taxed at graduated rates.
The graduated income tax therefore only aggrevated the purchasing power
plight of the head-of-household during inflation, and may further reinforce
the entry of secondary workers as multiple household income-earners.
The disproportionately large entry of secondary workers into the
civilian labor force as labor markets tightened has been substantiated: of
the 1.9 million more persons who worked in 1967 than in 1966, 1.3 million
fin /
were adult women and youths. Bogan has noted that the first sharp gain
made by women in year-round, full-time jobs was in 1964, with the notable
increase among Negro women as a specific indicator of the tightness in labor
61/
markets. Bogan further noted that the economic slowdown of early 1967
failed to reduce the influx of secondary workers into the labor force.
Though the most dramatic percentile increase of women in major occupational
groups between 1960 and 1970 was an 80 percent gain in skilled craftsmen and
kindred workers, this 218,000 increase in women skilled workers represents
6? /
only 2.8 percent of the total 8.0 million increase in female workers.
Additional women as service workers other than household, clerical, operatives,
and nonfarm laborers account for 70 percent of the increase in the female
labor force.
Forrest A. Bogan, "Work Experience of the Population: Spotlight
on Women and Youths," Monthly Labor Review , 92 (June, 1969), pp. 44-50.
61
Ibid. p. 47.
Janice N. Hedges, "Sex Stereotyping: Its Decline in the Skilled
Trades," Monthly Labor Review, 97 (May, 1974), pp. 14-22.
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The concentrated entry of the secondary labor force into the
unskilled, non-manufacturing labor markets is reflected in the different
excess supply implications of unemployment rates between the skilled and
unskilled workers. Gordon constructed the following table and commented in
his conclusion, "Among the occupational and industrial changes in the pattern
of unemployment, only one needs to be repeated here: the relative deteriora-
63/
tion in the position of unskilled laborers in 1965-67."
63
Robert A. Gordon, "Unemployment Patterns With Full Employment",
Industrial Relations, 8(0ctober, 1968), pp. 46-72. p. 71
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Table 8. Unemployment Rates by Occupation; Actual and Relative To
National Rate; 1965 and 1967. a
Blue Collar:
Actual Rates
Relative to
National Rate
Occupation 1965 1967 1965 1967
Craftsmen & foreman
Operatives
Laborers
3.6 2.8
5.5 4.8
8.6 8.7
0.80
1.22
1.91
0.70
1.21
2.19
The 1967 rates are adjusted to correspond with definitions of unemploy-
ment in the prior period.
Source: Gordon, op. cit., p. 67.
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If employers in the non-manufacturing sector are horizontally
competitive with the manufacturing sector for their initial incremental
supply of skilled workers during an economic boom but dip into an un-
organized, rapidly expanding labor pool for their unskilled workers, what
will be the affect on relative wages? Not only would the non-manufacturing
skill differential widen dramatically, but the occupational wage differentials
between the unskilled in manufacturing and non-manufacturing also should
widen if rigid, negotiated wage scales dominate in manufacturing.
The analysis of wage relationships in Table 7 indicates a negative
time-series coefficient between skilled workers in the two sectors for 13
of the 15 cities; and no significant difference in inter-sectoral skilled
wages for the latter 2 cities. These findings would support the horizontally-
competitive proposition, in that employers in the non-manufacturing sector
must increase their relative wages to attract moveable skilled workers
from the higher-wage manufacturing sector.
Wages of unskilled workers in manufacturing rose at rates in excess
of increases for their unskilled counterparts in non-manufacturing in 8
cities during 1965-73, and remained relatively unchanged in 5 cities. This
provides some evidence, though not a universal argument, that relative
wages of unskilled workers in manufacturing are not suseptible to the
dampening effects from outward shifts in the overall supply of the un-
skilled. Neither sector needs to bid up relative wages to increase their
respective queues, however. The maintenance of rigid wage scale parities
in some industries in manufacturing, and not increased wage premiums, cause
money wages of unskills in that sector to rise at rates in excess of un-
skilled workers in non-manufacturing.
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New York and Detroit remain the anomolies; the manufacturing/non-
manufacturing wage differential for unskills actually narrowed during this
period. As I preveriously discussed, an intensive unionization of certain
classes of unskilled workers in these 2 cities during 1965-73 could explain
the narrowing both of the inter-sectoral wages of their unskilled workers,
and the non-manufacturing skill differentials for these 2 cities alone.
The dampening effect on relative increases in money wages of the
non-manufacturing unskilled because of the entry of significant numbers of
labor force reserve women and youths into this labor market during 1964-68
is not intended to be suggestive that this is a statement of sex discrimina-
tion in wages. The data used in this report are not sufficiently refined
at this stage to test for sex discrimination wage differences.
Rather, other factors than overt wage discrimination contribute
to the wage differentials between occupations and sectors. First, the
non-manufacturing sector is_ the lower wage sector. Second, all labor
markets did not tighten at the same rates during the move to aggregate
"full employment." The entry of signficant numbers of labor reserve
individuals into the ranks of the unskilled in non-manufacturing continued
to shift that labor supply curve out at a pace about equal to the increase
in employer demand for these labor services, so that queues among these non-
manufacturing unskilled workers did not shrink as dramatically during
1965-67 as in other occupations. Third, each occupation has its own wage
scale comprised of grades or classifications. The entry wage is traditionally
less than the median wage in each occupation. Given the competitive factors
adverse to money wage increases for non-manufacturing unskilled workers
during this period, any entrant into this labor market could expect a
deteriorating relative wage relationship with other bluecollar workers.
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The actual entrants were predominately women and youths.
The impact of sex discrimination on earnings may be more in the
availability of job opportunities among the various labor markets than in
specific wage rates themselves. Cohen attempted to estimate weights for
the different determinates of pay differentials between women and men.
He attributes earnings differences between the sexes in nonprofessional
occupations to seniority, union membership, length of work-year, and presumed
greater mobility among men. Cohen states, "No doubt some discrimination
remains, but it is unlikely that much of it is due to wage differences
between men and women with the same job." The largest apparent difference
in wages was due to a greater portion of women in traditionally lower pay-
ing jobs. This is reinforced by wage premiums in the manufacturing sector.
McNulty observed that occupational averages for women were consistently
higher among establishments employing both men and iv-omen in the same job
than in establishments employing women only; "Establishments employing
women only in an occupation were frequently found to be in the lower paying
industry segments of non-manufacturing. ,,66/
Malcolm S. Cohen, "Sex Differences in Compensation," The Jo".rnal
of Human Resources , 6(Fall, 1971), pp. 434-47.
65
Ibid, p. 446.
Donald J. McNulty, "Differences in Pay Between Men and Women
Workers," Monthly Labor Review , 90(July, 1967), pp. 40-43.
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In the increased entry of women into the labor force since 1964,
specifically into the non-manufacturing unskilled labor markets, a secular
phenomenon reflecting pronounced institutional and attitudinal changes?
Or is this entry of women more of a reserve labor force phenomenon that
will vary with the business cycle? As with much of economics, the situa-
tion appears mixed. The quit rate has been used as one measure or workers'
attitudes, and the traditional role of women in increasing quit propensities
underwent a "drastic reversal" during the last decade commencing with
1964-65. As the relative proportion of women workers among industries
increased, the quit rate (in manufacturing) decreased. Barnes and Jones
acknowledge that changing work attitudes among women may have affected
quit rates since 1965, though the increased worklife and increased partici-
pation of women may simultaneously reduce their quitting to exit and increase
their quitting to move within the labor force. The levels of quits of
men and women may respond differently to changes in job opportunities
associated with the business cycle, which must be factored out of attitudinal
changes attributed to secular causes.
Paul A. Armknecht and John F. Early, "Quit Rates in Manufacturing:
A Study of Their Causes," Monthly Labor Review , 95 (November, 1972)
pp. 31-37.
68
William F. Barnes and Ethel B. Jones, "Manufacturing Quit Rates
Revisited: A Cyclical View of Women's Quits," Monthly Labor Review , 96
(December, 1973), and John F. Early, "Manufacturing Quit Rates Revisited:
Secular Changes and Women's Quits," Monthly Labor Review , 96(December, 1973),
pp. 57-58.

79.
Net discouraged potential-worker inflows rather than outflows may
dominate short-run changes in the labor force, and a pronounced decline
of women entering the labor force was observed during the downswing in
69/1970 and 1971. Even the data on net changes in the labor force — with-
out a further refinement for leavers, entrants, and intended entrants —
reflects continued cyclical employment among women (and minorities) as
last-hired and first-laid-of f
.
Jacob Mincer, "Determining Who Are the Hidden Unemployed,"
Monthly Labor Review, 96(March, 1973); pp. 27-30.
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The labor skill differential in the non-manufacturing sector is
more responsive to changing labor market conditions than in manufacturing,
and throughout 1965-73 the non-manufacturing skill differentials of the
respective cities continued to be directly related to changes in unemployment
(Table 7) . One would anticipate that in future normal swings in excess
labor supply corresponding to changes in business conditions and in the absence
of a sharp increase in inflation, than the non-manufacturing skill differential
likewide should widen during extended recessions and narrow as the economy
approached full employment.
But this response by the non-manufacturing skill differential to
generally-competitive conditions in that sector will be upset as the economy
encounters the Phillips Curve dilemma of overall relatively low unemployment
and sharply increasing inflation. Though the labor market for skilled workers
becomes increasingly tighter, the movement of the reserve labor force into
the available unskilled labor supply prolongs the tightening process in that
labor market.
The result is a pure inflation effect on the labor skill differential
in the non-manufacturing sector that widens this wage differential dramatically
over a prolonged inflationary period. Employers in the non-manufacturing
sector increase their wage-bids for skilled workers at rates that even exceed
the inflation-induced wage changes for skilled workers in the manufacturing
sector. Relative wage rigidities in the collectively-bargained wage scales
within the manufacturing sector protect unskilled workers in that administered
sector from the otherwise depressing wage effects from significant numbers
of labor reserve entrants into the ranks of unskilled labor.
70
That is, 3D/9U" 1 < 0.

82.
This "three-corner" link of inflation and inflation expectations
on the money wages of skilled and unskilled workers in manufacturing plus
the skilled workers in non-manufacturing leaves the non-manufacturing un-
skilled laborers holding the bag.
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